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Hungarian care managing organization (CMO) pilot program and its
environment, incentive structure, and preliminary outcomes. The
need to change the behavior of doctors to increase the effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of the system was the key rationale for the
Hungarian CMO pilot program. Methods: After an application proc-
ess, nine CMOs were entitled to enter into the system in July 1999. By
2006, there were 14 CMOs covering 2.1 million people. The Hungarian
CMO program tried to combine the advantages of both the US
managed care programs and the UK general practitioner fundholding
system, within the constraints and opportunities of a Central-
European country committed to a single-payer health insurance
system. Results: The revenue of CMOs derived from a risk-adjusted
capitation. The capitation formula was weighted only by age and sex.ee front matter Copyright & 2015, International S
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ndence to: Imre Boncz, Faculty of Health Sciences,The expenditures of the CMOs included all the health expenditures
on their patients that occurred in any part of the health care system.
The average savings rate for all CMOs for the ﬁscal years 1999 to 2007
was 4.94%. The highest rates of savings were realized in chronic and
acute inpatient care and medical devices. The pilot was discontinued
in 2008 without a comprehensive evaluation of the experience.
Conclusions: We can conclude that this pilot had a signiﬁcant
contribution to the modernization of the Hungarian health care
system.
Keywords: care managing, health care reform, health insurance,
Hungary, managed care, risk selection.
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Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Managed care is a generic term describing any health care system
that integrates the ﬁnancing and delivery of medical care [1]. The
term “managed care” became more popular in the past decade
outside of the United States, and there have been several efforts
to introduce managed care tools or managed care–like programs
in many other countries [2–5]. The implications of managed care
and the growing popularity of consumer-driven health plans are
discussed in the international literature [6–10]. All forms of
managed care attempt to control costs by modifying the behavior
of doctors [11,12].
Cost control and changing patients’ behavior could be con-
sidered as advantages, whereas difﬁculties with choosing a
physician who is “out of network” and delaying costly medical
intervention might be risky disadvantages of managed care.
Many important reforms took place in the Hungarian health
care system in the past 25 years, including a care managingorganization (CMO) pilot program introduced in 1999. We aim to
provide a description of this program, its environment, incentive
structure, and preliminary outcomes.The Hungarian Health Insurance System
The Hungarian health system is a solidarity-based national
health insurance system with compulsory participation for every
citizen. There is one purchaser, the National Health Insurance
Fund Administration (NHIFA; Országos Egészségbiztosítási Pénz-
tár). The employers and employees pay health insurance con-
tribution to a single fund that is complemented by general budget
transfers.
The central government owns most inpatient health care
providers. All health care providers have a service contract with
the NHIFA, which is a prerequisite for any payment made by the
NHIFA to providers. The NHIFA uses a mix of payment methodsociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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the general practitioners (GPs) come from a capitation fee. For
outpatient care, a fee-for-service payment system is used. Since
1993, acute inpatient care has been paid by a diagnosis related
group (DRG) system (the Hungarian term “Homogén Betegségc-
soportok” translates to “Homogeneous Disease Groups”). This
adapted DRG payment system covers all Hungarian acute care
hospitals.
All health care providers (GPs, outpatient specialists, and
inpatient care) submit monthly reports to the NHIFA. For both
the outpatient specialist and inpatient care, this report contains
detailed information on each patient treated in the institution
(personal data, diagnosis, treatment, etc.). There is a centralized
database that contains the data of each patient treated in any
outpatient department or inpatient institute of Hungary. The
patients are identiﬁed according to a unique social insurance
personal identiﬁcation number (társadalombiztosítási azonosító
jel). With the help of the social insurance personal identiﬁcation
number and the use of this nationwide central database service,
patients can be tracked within the whole country. Further
characteristics of the Hungarian health care system can be found
elsewhere [13–22].Key Characteristics of the CMO Pilot Program
The Hungarian CMO pilot program could be considered a public
sector–managed behavioral health care arrangement [23].
Although, as the Hungarian State Audit Ofﬁce noticed [24], the
speciﬁc aim of the CMO pilot program was not precisely deﬁned, it
had its implicit goals [25], as did other managed care programs [26].
It aimed tomonitor and coordinate care through the entire range of
services; to emphasize prevention and health education; to encour-
age the provision of care in the most appropriate setting and by the
most appropriate provider; to promote the cost-effective use of
services through aligning incentives; to strengthen the primary
care and outpatient care; and to improve the quality of care.
The conceptual foundations of the Hungarian implementation
of managed care is closer to what is called GP fundholding in the
United Kingdom than to health maintenance organizations in the
United States, but in terms of techniques used to control cost and
improve efﬁciency, the US managed care experience provided the
“toolbox” for reform. It is important to note that there are a
number of characteristics of the Hungarian version of managed
care that make it a very different system overall. For this reason,Fig. 1 – The structure of the Hungarian Care Mwe will refer to the Hungarian managed care organizations as
“care managing organizations” to signal the difference.
The Hungarian CMOs did not collect premiums. The system
operated in a publicly administered noncompetitive national
health insurance environment ﬁnanced primarily through
payroll tax. The CMOs did not decide on the level of contribu-
tions, nor on the package of services covered. Prices (tariffs)
were centrally set by the NHIFA. The pilot CMOs used the
same payment mechanisms as did all other providers who
were not participating. Opting out from the compulsory national
insurance system is not allowed, in contrast to the experience of
the exportation of managed care to Chile [8]. The Hungarian CMO
model was similar to the UK GP fundholding system in
that it provided a capitation budget for a provider who was, in
turn, responsible to provide or purchase care for the covered
population.
In the operation framework (Fig. 1), provider organizations
applied to the NHIFA and had a virtual budget, an adjusted
capitation account, determined by the size and characteristics of
the population they cover. Enrollment was by the GPs and not the
individual patients; therefore, there was no room for risk selec-
tion at the patient level. The GP enrolled the population in his or
her list into the CMO pilot program. Patients who did not want to
be enrolled into the CMO had the option to change their GP to
another GP who was not involved in the managed care program.
The CMOs were self-selected through an application process, and
then systematically selected by the NHIFA. Generally, half the
applicants succeeded to become CMOs.
The CMO took responsibility for arranging the whole spectrum
of health services to a local or subregional population deﬁned by
being on the list of the constituent GPs. However, patients were
still free to choose specialists and hospitals including those not
contracted by the CMO. The NHIFA paid the actual provider of
care for all services according to the national payment system,
and then charged the virtual budget of the CMO for all paid
services of the population covered by the CMO. Thus, it was not
the CMO that paid other providers directly but the NHIFA against
the virtual capitation budget of the CMO. The aim was to provide
care at the least expensive level that is appropriate for the
patient’s condition. Typically, the CMOs run an integrated infor-
mation system to monitor all patient-related clinical and cost
data, and then to analyze performance against benchmarks. The
source of information was mainly the central database of nation-
ally collected activity information of all health care providers
maintained by the NHIFA. It was a keen challenge for theanaging Organization Pilot Programme.
Table 1 – Main steps in the development of the Hungarian CMO pilot program.
Date Event No. of
CMOs
No. of
enrollees
Average no.
of enrollees
per organizer
% of the
total
population
December 1998 Legal background for program 200,000
July 1999 Starting of the pilot program (minimum 20,000
enrollees per organizer)
9 158,984 17,665 1.55
October 1999 One organizer dropped out 8 140,931 17,616 1.37
December 1999 Three organizers dropped out 5 88,232 17,646 0.86
October 2000 New application: increased number of enrollees of
current organizers to 200,000 (minimum 40,000
enrollees per organizer)
5 199,882 39,976 1.95
June 2001 New application: two new entries and number of
enrollees reached 500,000 (minimum 40,000 per
organizer)
7 493,076 70,439 4.81
June 2002 Small changes in the number of enrollees (minimum
50,000 enrollees per organizer)
7 476,531 68,076 4.65
July 2003 New application: Four new entries and the number of
enrollees reached 1,000,000
11 1,000,000 90,909 9.76
2004 New application: Seven new entries and the number
of enrollees may reach 2,000,000 (minimum 75,000
enrollees per organizer)
18 1,885,045 104,725 18.48
2005 Changes in the number of enrollees, merging of CMOs,
and the number of enrollees may reach 2,500,000
(minimum 100,000 enrollees per organizer since July
1, 2005)
18/16 2,283,621 142,726 22.52
2006 Two organizers left the pilot. Expected decision of the
future of the Hungarian CMO program
14 2,066,766 147,626 22.38
2007 No signiﬁcant changes in the program 14 2,066,766 147,626 22.38
2008 Abolishing the Hungarian CMO pilot program
CMO, care managing organization.
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care and health care utilization [27].Development of the Hungarian CMO Pilot Program
between 1999 and 2008
The legal background of the Hungarian CMO pilot program dates
back to the end of 1998. After an application process, nine CMOs
were selected to participate in the pilot program that started in
July 1999. CMOs were all health service providers. Financial
institutions were not allowed to participate. The primary require-
ment for applying to become a CMO was that the organization
must already have a service contract with the NHIFA. Applicants
had to meet a set of criteria including a minimum number of
patients enrolled through participation by their GPs. The main
steps in the development of the Hungarian CMO pilot program
are presented in Table 1. The size of the population covered by
the pilot program increased steadily, reaching 1 million people by
July 2003. In the following year, the pilot program was expanded
to almost 2,000,000 people through a new application process and
seven new qualifying organizations. Over the years, the mini-
mum number of enrollees per organizer increased from 20,000
(1999) to 100,000 (2005). With some merging of CMOs in 2005 and
two organizers leaving the program in 2006, the number of
organizers decreased to 14, with a covered population of 2.1
million people.
We should emphasize that initially the catchment area of the
CMOs was not deﬁned geographically, which allowed for some risk
selection through the exclusion of GPs with a higher risk pool. To
eliminate this form of risk selection in the pilot, a new regulationwas introduced in 2005, which automatically included all patients
into the virtual account of the CMOs if the CMOs had already
covered 70% of the population of a certain geographical area.
After 2005, data protection rules changed in Hungary and
CMOs faced a new challenge. Until 2005, the GPs could have
entered into the CMO pilot program by informing their patients
about the entry, but after 2005 the patients themselves had to
sign a personal statement of agreement to enter into the program
and to allow the CMO to use their personal medical data. This
new regulation proved to be a severe administrative hurdle that
eventually led to the collapse of the pilot program because CMOs
and GPs were not able to collect the personal statement from all
the people already in the pilot program. Finally, a governmental
decree [28] ofﬁcially declared the end of the pilot program.Financial Balance of the CMO: Revenues and
Expenditures
The revenue of the CMOs came from a risk-adjusted capitation
from the NHIFA. The health services covered by the capitation fee
are presented in Table 2. As a general rule, we can say that
almost all health services that are reported to the NHIFA with the
social security number of the patients were covered by capitation.
This also means that the Hungarian capitation fee was set on the
basis of individual (but aggregated) health care utilization data
[29]. Therefore, CMOs’ revenue depends on the population cov-
ered instead of the services provided [30].
The calculation of capitation fees was based on data reported
for health insurance reimbursement by the health services
providers during the previous year. There was a different
Table 2 – Health services included into and
excluded from the capitation fee.
A. Health services covered
by the capitation fee
B. Health services NOT
covered by the capitation
(paid separately)
Primary care of GPs GPs’ duty
Dental care Health visitors, mother, youth,
and child care
Outpatient care Reimbursement of traveling
costs related to health care
CT, MRI examinations Certain very expensive, rarely
used medical procedures,
and expensive disposable
tools
(e.g., medical sewing
machines) and implants
Renal dialyses (acute and
chronic)
Expenditures for disability to
work (sick-pay)
Inpatient care (acute and
chronic)
Special drug budget (drugs
available with limitations)
Home care (nursing)
Drug subsidies for outpatient
care (excluding special
budget)
Medical devices
Balneology
Caretaking of certain chronic
care
Transportation of patients
and death
CT, computed tomography; GP, general practitioner; MRI, magnetic
resonance imaging.
12,0%
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capitation formula was weighted by age and sex; therefore, it had
only limited predictive power for actual costs [31]. The only
additional risk factor used was renal dialysis, for which a special
capitation payment was added to account for the high cost and
reduce ﬁnancial risk.
It is important to emphasize that the risk-adjusted capitation
was just theoretical revenue in a virtual budget of the CMOs, and
not an actual cash payment. Separate from the virtual capitation
rate, there were two cash payments made directly to the bank
account of the CMO: a fee to cover the extra costs of management
related to the program, and an additional fee to cover the extra
costs of mandatory prevention programs that the organizers
were obligated to provide. The expenditures of the CMOs
included all health expenditures on their patients that occurred
in any part of the health care system.3,6%
10,4%
6,5%
8,7%
3,4%
4,0%
2,1%
2,9% 2,9%
0,0%
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Fig. 2 – Financial results (savings as a percent of total
revenues) of the Hungarian Care Managing Organization
Pilot Programme (1999-2007).Savings of the CMO Pilot Program
The NHIFA opened a virtual account for each CMO and kept track
of revenues from capitation and expenditures of the covered
population. At the end of the year, the NHIFA calculated the
ﬁnancial balance of the organizers by comparing enrollees’ per
capita rates with enrollees’ use of services. If the ﬁnancial
balance showed a surplus at the end of the year, the CMO
realized part of the savings and it was transferred to them as a
cash payment. For CMOs that had a deﬁcit, there were no
penalties or other consequences. Since 2003, the total savings
of all the CMOs collectively formed a reserve, a solidarity fund for
compensating the deﬁcits by pilot sites with a negative balance
sheet, so that the CMOs had a collective ﬁnancial risk for losses.CMOs were allowed to use savings to make incentive payments
to their contracted GPs and staff members. Since 2003, the CMOs
were obliged to set up a complex reward system that included
incentives not only for their GPs and staff members but also for
the contracted partner providers of the CMOs that played sig-
niﬁcant roles in the medical care of the enrolled patients.
Financial results of the Hungarian CMO pilot program are
shown in Figs. 2 and 3. The savings are calculated as a percentage
of revenues [32]. Fig. 2 shows the ﬁnancial results (savings as a
percentage of total revenues) of the Hungarian CMO pilot pro-
gram (1999–2004). The total savings rates for all CMOs for the
ﬁscal years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007
were 3.6%, 10.4%, 6.5%, 8.7%, 3.4%, 4.0%, 2.1%, 2.9%, and 2.9%,
respectively. All the organizers realized savings during this
period. CMO number 6 and 7 entered the system in June 2001
and so have no data for ﬁscal year 1999 or 2000 (Fig. 3A). The
highest savings were realized in chronic and acute inpatient care
and medical devices (Fig. 3B). More detailed data on the savings
according to CMOs and type of health services are not available
for years beyond 2004.Tools of Managed Care Organizations
One of the greatest challenges for the NHIFA was to create and
operate a nationwide monitoring system to control utilization of
health services. As a response to the failure to meet this
challenge, the CMOs were to improve this function. The CMOs
were themselves medical providers and could act locally to
control utilization. Their goal was to ensure that care is delivered
cost-effectively at the right level without wasting resources. In
doing so, they monitored expenditure at all levels (outpatient and
inpatient care, drugs and medical devices, computed tomogra-
phy/magnetic resonance imaging examinations, etc.) and took
appropriate actions to maximize efﬁciency.
In theory, managed care can succeed in two ways: it may
lower costs for individual services and/or it may improve the
efﬁciency of service across the full vertical spectrum of service
provision for an individual’s illness. By providing more effective
care early, it may avoid more costly care at a later stage. By
substituting high-cost services with less costly modes of care
(e.g., outpatient instead of inpatient surgery, nursing home care
instead of hospital care), it may achieve the same ends with less
cost. Variations in the treatment of many acute and chronic
diseases may be reduced by disease management programs that
follow clinical protocols developed as best practices [33].
The organizers of the CMO pilot program took the resp-
onsibility of organizing many preventive activities, including
(A)
(B)
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patients better information about self-care, in terms of
both improving individual health habits to reduce risks and
monitoring their own health and treatment. Hungarian CMOs
could afford to develop information systems that tracked
patients over time and provided information to their partners,
including primary care practitioners, about patients at risk.
In the Hungarian system, there are no methods for admin-
istrative denials of medical care either within or outside of the
pilot—which, of course, may lead to overuse in some cases.Discussion and Conclusions
It is often asked whether the experience of managed care in one
country can be transferred to another country [34] or even whether
managed care is viable for Europe today [35]. Some articles havereported that the US experience is more useful in generating
hypotheses rather than predicting results for European countries
[36]. This is clearly so for the United Kingdom, andmight also be true
for Hungary. Table 3 presents a comparison of the managed care
programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Hungary.
Active purchasing tools that incorporate disease management
programs and alignment of incentives between purchasers and
providers respond to key issues facing health care reform in
many countries. Selective adoption of these tools may be even
more relevant in single-payer systems than in the fragmented,
voluntary US insurance market where these can be applied more
systematically with lower transaction costs and where the effects
can be measured more precisely [26]. The Hungarian CMO pilot
program tried to implement the advantages of both the US
managed care programs and the UK GP fundholding system,
within the constraints and opportunities of a Central-European
country committed to a single-payer system.
Table 3 – Comparison of the managed care programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Hungary.
Characteristics US UK Hungary
HMO PPO GP fundholding
(before 1999)
Primary care
groups (after
1999)
CMO pilot
program
Cream skimming Yes Yes No No Limited
Free market access for
organizers
Yes Yes Limited Limited Limited
Legal status of managed care
organizations
No
limitations
No
limitations
Group of GPs Group of GPs Health care
providers
Financial risk of organizers Yes No Collective risk
for
organizers
Integration of purchaser and
provider
Strong Limited Weak Weak Weak
Standardized beneﬁts package
for consumers
No No Yes Yes Yes
Health services covered by
managed care
No uniform
range of
services
No uniform
range of
services
Mainly outpatient
services and drug
prescription
Whole range of
health services
Whole range of
health
services
Control of utilization of
services
Strong Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Patient freedom to choose
providers
Strong
limitations
Some
limitation
No limitation No limitation No limitation
Geographical monopoly of
organizers
No No No Yes Not
compulsory
but preferred
Selective contracting with
providers
Yes Yes No No No
Price competition of providers No Yes No No No
CMO, care managing organization; GP, general practitioner; HMO, health maintenance organization; PPO, preferred provider organization.
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could be considered an important step in the continuous process
of health care reform. Previous elements of Hungarian health
care reforms (e.g., implementation of a DRG system of payment
for inpatient care) provided a solid foundation and experience
with detailed data collection, cost sensitivity of providers, and
improvement in technical efﬁciency. The fact that the new CMO
pilot program was based on voluntary applications of organizers
allowed this reform to evolve from the bottom-up, and to be
driven by local management incentives. The key elements of the
Hungarian CMO model can be summarized as follows.1. The CMO model provided a transparent incentive system for
both organizers and providers that counteracted and balanced
the adverse incentives in the current system (such as increas-
ing output/volume of providers, inﬂuence by representatives
of manufacturers of health industry).2. The efﬁciency gains by providers allowed them to obtain
additional resources for further investments. The Hungarian
model focused on reducing unjustiﬁed expenses instead of
increasing revenues.3. Cooperation between CMOs and other providers with whom
they contract for services.4. Information asymmetry between the insurer and providers
had been reduced with the entry of CMOs. The information
ﬂow and many forms of formal and informal collaboration
between the different players have contributed to exploring
potential efﬁciency gains in the system.
It was expected that this pilot project will improve both the
effectiveness and efﬁciency of care by reducing duplication andparallel service provision, avoiding unnecessary referrals, and
reducing providers’ incentives to induce demand for specialist
outpatient and inpatient care.
The usual complaints [26] against managed care organizations
(cost saving; provider reimbursement is too low to provide
adequate health care; quality of care provided by managed care
organizations is substandard) were under serious scrutiny in
Hungary, but not supported by evidence. There was no evidence
on denial of care or reduced access to high-cost services. The
Hungarian program contributed to the use of health economics in
decision making in health care [37].
The Hungarian CMOs were encouraged to follow a strategy of
investment in areas such as primary care, prevention, case
management for high-risk patients, and medication reviews.
CMOs were incentivized to explore all potential efﬁciency gains
such as following protocols for early treatment, or providing
medical follow-up care to avoid rehospitalization.
In parallel with the development of CMO pilot program,
several other tools were applied for cost-containment in Hun-
gary. In 2004, in addition to the DRG-based hospital ﬁnancing, a
ﬁnancial cap was introduced for acute care hospital ﬁnancing
[38]. In 2006, 25% of acute care hospital beds were either closed or
transformed to chronic care beds [39]. Both might have contrib-
uted to the improved efﬁciency of the Hungarian health care
system [40].
The CMO pilot program prompted heated debates during the
past years in Hungary. Some people considered it as incompatible
with the Hungarian solidarity-based health insurance system;
therefore, they wanted to cancel the program. Other experts
thought that this program could serve as an important starting
point for further health care reforms. Regardless of the opinions
V A L U E I N H E A L T H R E G I O N A L I S S U E S 7 C ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 7 – 3 3 33of experts, scholars, and participating stakeholders, enrollment
in the Hungarian CMO pilot program declined during the period
2006 to 2007 and it was ofﬁcially abolished in 2008 without a
comprehensive evaluation of its performance.Key Points1. What is already known about the topic?
 Managed care is a generic term describing any health care
system that integrates the ﬁnancing and delivery of
medical care.
 Managed care is an important approach of organizing
health care systems in the United States.
 GP fundholding proved to be an important tool for health
care reform in the United Kingdom.2. What does the article add to existing knowledge?
 This article describes the experiences with managed care/
fundholding approach in Hungary.
 We analyzed the cost-saving potential of managed care in
an Eastern-European setting, in Hungary.
3. (optional) What insights does the article provide for informing
health care–related decision making?
This article informs health care decision makers about the
possibilities of care managing programs in an Eastern-
European setting.Acknowledgment
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